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Reliability and Safety Prediction Methods 
For Mission and Spaceport Operations 
 
Dr. Marianna Pensky, University of Central Florida  
Astrid E. Heard, NASA, J. F. Kennedy Space Center 
      
Background 
 
At KSC and other Space Flight Operations (SFO) NASA centers, a great deal of effort is 
expended to collect, analyze and report statistical data on performance of space vehicle systems 
during tests and operations.  In all cases, an effort is made to mitigate the risk of failure and 
improve safety and reliability by finding systems that may benefit from some sort of corrective 
action.  Statistical data summarizing performance of space vehicle systems  can sometimes enable 
evaluation of the best possible type of corrective action to use, such as replacement versus 
redesign.  However, complexity and time constraints of existing methods do not allow performing 
this analysis on every system for every test or operation.  So current practice stresses isolation of   
the most vulnerable systems in order to perform more detailed analysis and corrective action, if 
necessary.  Ultimately, the final decision for vehicle launch is based on testing that all vehicle 
systems are operating nominally, in the hope that all possible actions have been taken to ensure 
these systems continue to operate safely and reliably. 
 
In addition, Safety and Health data related to personnel issues is collected in the form of 
metrics that count occurrences of events of interest.  These events are generally relevant to 
assuring that personnel are operating at optimal health and safety levels necessary for peak 
performance of their duties and responsibilities, thereby contributing to the overall safety and 
reliability of a mission.  Metric data is usually evaluated quarterly using histograms for visual 
interpretation of trends. 
 
In view of the increasing complexity of spaceport operations, significant improvement 
can be achieved by moving from ``snapshot” evaluation of trends towards tools for continuous or 
automatic detection of unfavorable tendencies.  Application of advanced statistical techniques for 
trend analysis can help in such efforts.  We propose the use of  nonhomogeneous Poisson 
processes to fit distributions of events, such as problems (failures) detected in a space vehicle 
system, and applying empirical Bayes techniques ([3], [9]) to estimation of event intensity as well 
as testing for possible change points in the intensity function [4]. 
 
It is important to note that the system level analysis being proposed is at a higher level 
than the type of component reliability analysis performed by logistics and safety personnel such 
as FMEA’s, Hazard Analysis, etc.  Results of such component analysis is not currently integrated 
into the system level analysis discussed above.  However, once failure probabilities and trends are 
established, Bayesian techniques can help to integrate such information in order to further refine 
the results [9].  
 
Current Practice  
 
As one example of current practice, we describe a few of the processes used to maintain 
reliability of the Shuttle Orbiter.  Every six months, a five-year Orbiter Problem Trend Analysis 
Report1 is produced, based on the JSC Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) 
                                                          
1 SSMA-02-003, Orbiter Problem Trend Analysis Report – Covers Issue Date to 5 years prior 
database.  This report compares the problems reported on each major Orbiter subsystem and 
dissects them with respect to quantity, frequency, severity and many other factors.   Similar to the  
“Triage Process” in an emergency room that allows a doctor to determine the most seriously 
injured patients and treat them immediately, this report identifies the most “problematic” systems, 
and thus could initiate analysis of a specific Orbiter subsystem.   The Trend Analysis Report does 
not distinguish between Orbiters, implying that the systems are basically equivalent on all four 
Orbiters.  Figure 1 contains a sample data summary for the Digital Processing System.  Data for 
each system is presented in the same manner.  Statistics for multiple systems are then grouped on 
a single spreadsheet for the purpose of identification of the highest risk systems based on the 
problem report analysis. 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 1 
 
 
Whether initiated by the Trend Analysis Report, by management direction, or some other 
means, periodically an in-depth Reliability and Maintenance Analysis2 of an Orbiter system is 
prepared.  Reliability and maintenance analysis may indicate the need for some sort of corrective 
action, redesign or replacement of systems or system components.  If severity is significant, the 
Orbiter will not be processed for a launch until an appropriate corrective action is taken.   Various 
methods of statistical analysis techniques, all perfectly valid, are currently utilized to reach 
conclusions.  However, the real problem stems from the fact that this is a “snapshot” analysis, and 
no assessment of the condition of the system is performed until the next time a “snapshot” 
analysis is completed. 
 
As another example of current practice, we describe the Safety and Health Metrics, collected and 
reported quarterly. Figure 2 shows one of these metrics, KSC Lost Time Injuries.  Each metric is 
the collection of counts representing occurrences of events of interest such as number of Lost 
Time Injuries or number of Maximum Worktime Deviations within specified periods of time. The 
data is presented via histograms. Evaluation is primarily based on the height of histogram bars, 
                                                          
2 Multiplexer/DeMultiplexer:  SSMA-00-004,  Fuel Cell System: SSMA-98-002, Orbiter Maneuvering 
System: SSMA-99-002 
and no statistical analysis of trend is performed.  In fact, on the basis of data presented in the 
report, the annual trend cannot be evaluated until the year is over.  Corrective action, if required, 
cannot be initiated or suggested in a timely fashion using this methodology. While specific goals 
are formulated, such as “decrease the number of Lost Time Injuries to zero”, there are no tools 
other than visual judgment to assess progress. 
 
     
         
     Figure 2 
 
Enhancement Options 
 
The situations described above have several similarities.  First, the data is represented in a 
similar form.  The events are recorded, then transformed into “bin counts” as the number of 
events per fixed time intervals.  Second, the questions of interest are similar: “Is the system 
improving or deteriorating?  Is the failure (event) rate increasing, decreasing, or constant in 
time?“  Third, the shortcomings of statistical procedures in both situations are the same.  The 
trend analysis is based largely on visual assessment and performed periodically in a “snapshot” 
fashion.  Last, the relations between various characteristics are not analyzed which make it 
difficult to gauge progress towards specific goals.  There is an assortment of methodologies that 
may be explored to enhance these current practices.   These methods fall into four categories: 
 
?? Basic analysis of trends performed continuously for assessment of positive or adverse 
trends. 
?? Monitoring of trends performed automatically, reducing the need for work-intensive 
manually prepared reports based on production of histograms and bar charts.  
?? Detailed assessment of trends performed periodically (i.e. annually) for realignment of 
statistical parameters used in the basic analysis. 
?? Alternative risk and trend measures to provide improved insight into the condition of a 
system for reaching conclusions and making decisions based on available data. 
 
Technical Approach   
 
Basic analysis of trends could be approached by modeling the counts Ni, i=1,…n, which 
represent the number of events within the i-th time interval [ti, ti+1], as a nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process  ([2], [8]), i.e. 
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where is a time dependent intensity function.  The latter implies that the time of the k-th 
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The objective of the analysis is to make conclusions about the behavior of (t)? .   
 
Monitoring activity would then be based on the resulting behavior of .  If   is a 
constant or a decreasing function, the failure rate is not increasing and no actions need to be 
taken, otherwise, system reliability personnel should be alerted. 
(t)? (t)?
 
The shape of can vary depending on many factors.  For example, it can be an 
increasing or a decreasing function, or have the “bathtub curve” U-shape. [6]   The latter happens 
if initially the failures are due to the defects of some repairable (replaceable) elements of the 
system.  As soon as these defects are corrected, the failure rate goes down until it starts increasing 
again due to the aging of the system.  If the system has a U-shaped failure intensity function, the 
objective may be to determine whether t > t
(t)?
0 where t0 is the lowest point of (t)? .  Another option 
may be to control whether ? < where (t) 0? 0? is a threshold chosen in advance. 
 
Periodic detailed assessments of the condition of the system can be divided according to 
the frequency of their implementation. After short fixed periods of time (for example, monthly) 
or after a significant event (failure, repairs, design changes),  testing could be implemented to 
determine whether there is a change in the intensity function by analyzing the change point in the 
sequence  using failure counts or failure time data. 1 2, , ,? ? ?L n
 
Two types of methods can be used for this purpose, the change point analysis techniques 
and the empirical Bayes techniques. The change point analysis [4] monitors whether any change 
occurred in the distribution of event counts and identifies the direction of the change.  The 
empirical Bayes methods (for example, [3] and [7]) allows estimation of values of  
corresponding to each time interval and check whether the value of 
i?
?  corresponding to the last 
time interval is smaller than some pre-assigned value 0? .   Thus, empirical Bayes techniques 
provide estimates of i? ’s necessary for insight into the current condition of a system while 
change point analysis provides a tool for testing hypotheses about changes in the intensity 
function . (t)?
(t)?
t)
(t)
 
Occasionally, analysis can be performed to re-estimate and test the shape of the intensity 
function .  These tasks can be accomplished using traditional frequentist or Bayesian 
statistical methods. If the intensity function has a power law growth 
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then is constant, increasing or decreasing depending on whether (? ?  = 1,  > 1 or ?  <1, 
respectively. Constructing confidence intervals and testing hypotheses about ?  based on a 
?
2? -
pivotal quantity is a part of an American National Standard ANSI/IEC/ASQ D61164–1997 [1].  
We suggest a wider class of the shapes for (t)? which include increasing, decreasing and U-type 
shapes to represent : (t)?
 
(t)? = 1 1 2 2a exp(b t) a exp(b t)? .   
 
Then is an increasing function if ; a decreasing function if b? 2 2 1 1(a b ) /(a b ) 1?
1 1) /(a b ) 1
1 and b2 are both 
negative and have a U-shape if 2 2(a b ? ? .  Since it is impossible to derive a pivotal 
quantity for this wider class of intensity functions, we shall perform estimation (point and 
interval) as well as hypothesis testing using Bayesian methods.  Introducing priors on a1, b1, a2 
and b2 with unknown or random parameters (the latter technique is known as hierarchical Bayes), 
we estimate the unknown parameters of the priors from data by maximizing empirical likelihood, 
thus, performing parametric empirical Bayes analysis [3].   The confidence intervals are 
constructed and the hypotheses are tested on the basis of the posterior distributions of a1, b1, a2 
and b2 given data. 
 
Some alternative risk and trend measurement ideas are also proposed below for 
application towards improved insight for reaching conclusions and making decisions based on 
available data.  One concept, for which an assortment of statistical tools is available, is the 
analysis of dependencies to mitigate risk and unfavorable future trends.  Data sets concerning 
failures of various parts of equipment as well as various data sets on safety and health of the 
personnel may not be independent.  Discovering hidden relationships between data sets can be 
useful for influencing characteristics that can be manipulated in order to produce desirable effects 
on other measures that cannot be controlled. For example, in the Safety and Health metrics there 
is a high positive correlation between worktime deviation (controllable parameter) and the 
number of worktime injuries (uncontrollable parameter).  Understanding dependencies between 
failures in various parts and systems of the Shuttle vehicles could lead to design enhancements of 
the existing vehicles or lessons learned towards production of a new space vehicle. 
 
In Spring 2002, KSC called for proposals on “A Reusable Launch Vehicle Operations 
Analysis Tool”. One of the objectives of the project was to compare various shuttle designs on 
the basis of the currently available data in order to improve space vehicle reliability and decrease 
turnaround time. One of the possible approaches to the problem is to compare failure data for the 
systems of interest while they were operating in existing space vehicles or elsewhere.  For 
example, we have two sets of data (event counts or failure times) for failures of two comparable 
types of equipment:   and .  The first design is preferable to the second 
whenever P = P(X < Y ) >½  if  X
1 mX , ,XL 1Y , ,YL m
i, i=1,…,n and Yj, j=1,…,n are event counts, or whenever  
P = P(X < Y ) < ½  if  Xi, i=1,…,n and Yj, j=1,…,n are the intervals between failure times.  
Constructing interval estimators for P = P(X < Y ) and testing hypotheses about P allows one to 
draw conclusions about what system or design is superior to the other. Several methods exist to 
accomplish such goals [5].   The problem can be generalized to vector-valued event counts or can 
be formulated in terms of system reliability. 
 
Suggested Implementation Strategies 
 
    There are some strategies that could be helpful to follow in the course of implementing 
statistical analysis. First, current practice involves recreating raw bin count data each time it is 
collected, and storing it electronically, on personal computers, or manually, in a paper file or 
document. This makes old data sets and reports practically unavailable for later analysis. One 
very important strategy in order to improve this situation is to begin maintaining the raw event-
count data in a centralized simple database, so that all prior data sets are easily accessible for 
analysis. 
Second, since all reports follow the same pattern, it is natural to provide a capability to 
produce reports automatically on request for the specified period of time along with standard 
graphic visualization tools.  The available statistical procedures can then be run automatically and 
present the results in these reports.  In addition, statistical procedures should be ”attached” to 
preparatory questions asked by the user (for example, “has the rate of lost time injures at KSC 
changed in the last month?, year?”).  Several statistical procedures could then be run to answer 
the question. If the results of the procedures agree with each other, this gives double confidence 
in the result; otherwise, visual assessment of the graphs and deeper analysis of the situation by 
responsible personnel may be necessary.  Once the reports are produced, they should be available 
for printing if this is required, which may not always be the case. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to identify additional key characteristics and trends in existing data   
that might enhance understanding of the current situation and to provide advanced statistical tools 
to extract these factors of importance.  Advanced statistical tools should be attached to the data 
base, described previously, enabling advanced analysis of data, such as analysis of dependencies 
in data, analysis of system reliability, etc. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The proposed development of increasingly automated, flexible, more accurate and 
multiple assessment capability tools can improve the current insight into safety and reliability of 
space vehicle operations and the personnel involved.  Building of an easily accessible historical 
database and providing automatic procedures for evaluation of trends in existing data, continuous 
monitoring of characteristics of interest and visualizing data on request allows the continued 
refinement and reassessment of many safety and reliability aspects.  Once an automated tool suite 
is developed, reports can be produced automatically, decreasing current report production 
expenses and enhancing decision support on the basis of the most current data.  Thus, controlling 
equipment reliability as well as monitoring health and safety of personnel can be done regularly 
with decreased data analysis turnaround time. 
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